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I am an assistant professor of philosophy at Macalester College, in St. Paul, MN. My main research area is the intersection of moral philosophy and the philosophy of action, but my work touches on questions in epistemology, metaethics, bioethics, and the philosophy of law. I have side interests in the philosophy of race and gender and political philosophy.
Most of my research concerns philosophical questions about fundamental concepts used in ethical thinking, whether in moral philosophy proper or in related areas such as clinical bioethics and the criminal law. My current focus is on concepts relating to human motivation, including forward-looking concepts like that of a person's intention to do something in the future, and backward-looking concepts like a person's reason for having done something in the past. These concepts generate a host of philosophical puzzles, and my goal is to contribute to our understanding of them. I've also spent a lot of time thinking about the normative and evaluative concepts we use in moral philosophy and related areas, including the concept of a good reason to do something (or a "normative reason"). My approach to these concepts is a version of what's called the Reasoning View. At Macalester I teach courses in ethics, bioethics, metaethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of race and gender. In spring 2019, I'm on sabbatical. C.V.? Here. E-mail? sasarnow [at] macalester [dot] edu. Asarnow? uh-SAR-no (/ʌˈsɑr noʊ/). |
Fig. 1: Standing in front of art
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Published Papers"Internal Reasons and the Boy Who Cried Wolf"
Ethics 130, 1 (pages TBA) (2019) [draft coming soon] Argues against Reasons Internalism by situating that thesis in the context of the debate about subjective and objective reasons. "On Not Getting Out of Bed" Philosophical Studies (vol. and pages TBA) (2018) [final; draft] Presents (but does not resolve) a new puzzle about the requirements of rationality on intentions. "The Reasoning View and Defeasible Practical Reasoning" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95, 3: 614-636 (2017) [final; draft] Defends the Reasoning View against an objection; argues that the norms of practical reasoning are defeasible or non-monotonic. "Rational Internalism" Ethics 127, 1: 147-178 (2016) [final] Argues, on action-theoretic grounds, that the Reasoning View is more plausible than Objectivist ("value-based") theories of normative reasons. Book Reviews"Review of Tim Henning, From a Rational Point of View"
Ethics 130, 1 (pages TBA) (2019) [draft coming soon] "Review of David Sobel, From Valuing to Value" The Philosophical Review 128, 2 (246-249) (2019) [draft] |
Fig. 2: Winter in St. Paul, Minnesota
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Work in ProgressTo help preserve anonymity in the review process, I don't post the titles of my unpublished work here. But if you're looking for a visiting speaker or referee, this should give you a sense of what I'm working on. In some cases drafts are available upon request.
Papers currently under review A paper on the distinctive practical attitude theory of intention and metaethical noncognitivism. Work in progress A paper on motivating reasons and the Reasoning View. A paper on subjective reasons and the Reasoning View. A paper laying out the master argument for the Reasoning View. A paper on the functionalism and the requirements of rationality. A paper on shared agency and cognitive sophistication. A paper on squeamishness. A paper on forgetfulness. |
Fig. 3: Winter in São Paulo, Brasil
keywords: samuel asarnow, sam asarnow, asarnow
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