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I am an assistant professor of philosophy at Macalester College, in St. Paul, MN.
I specialize in ethics, action theory, and metaethics. My research touches on questions in epistemology, the philosophy of of mind, bioethics, and the philosophy of law. I have side interests in the philosophy of race and gender and political philosophy, and a nascent interest in the philosophy of psychiatry. At Macalester I teach courses in ethics, bioethics, metaethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of race and gender. In fall 2019, I'm teaching epistemology and our senior seminar. C.V.? Here. E-mail? sasarnow [at] macalester [dot] edu. Asarnow? uh-SAR-no (/ʌˈsɑr noʊ/). |
Fig. 1: Standing in front of art
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Published Papers"Internal Reasons and the Boy Who Cried Wolf"
Ethics 130, 1 (pages TBA) (2019) [draft] This is my attempt to explain why you shouldn't be a reasons internalist (or a subjectivist about normative reasons, for that matter). In brief: seemingly powerful sources of appeal for that view evaporate once you get clear about the distinction between objective and subjective reasons. "On Not Getting Out of Bed" Philosophical Studies 176, 6: 1639-1666 (2019) [final; draft] How does intention lead to action? I have no idea. This paper tries to capture my confusion about that question by describing a new puzzle about intentions. Please let me know if you think of a solution! "The Reasoning View and Defeasible Practical Reasoning" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95, 3: 614-636 (2017) [final; draft] This paper presents my favorite version of the Reasoning View about normative reasons, and argues that the norms of practical reasoning are defeasible or non-monotonic (just like the norms of theoretical reasoning). "Rational Internalism" Ethics 127, 1: 147-178 (2016) [final] This is my attempt to explain why you shouldn't be an objectivist about normative reasons. In brief: you should accept the Reasoning View instead, as the Reasoning View is compatible with the standard motivations for objectivism while being far more plausible from an action-theoretic perspective. Book Reviews"Review of Tim Henning, From a Rational Point of View"
Ethics 130, 1 (pages TBA) (2019) [draft coming soon] This book develops a semantic theory for sentences that embed both propositional attitude words and deontic modals. What it does well: provide a more fully compositional explanation of the behavior of those sentences than anyone else has done, as far as I know. What it doesn't do: solve 100% of the philosophical questions in metaethics (though who could expect it to?). "Review of David Sobel, From Valuing to Value" The Philosophical Review 128, 2 (246-249) (2019) [draft] [final] This book collects 15 of Sobel's excellent essays on normative reasons, welfare, and consequentialism. What it does well: present a unified and appealing view of a wide swath of ethics. What it doesn't do: explain why subjectivism is better than the Reasoning View. |
Fig. 2: Winter in St. Paul, Minnesota
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Work in ProgressTo help preserve anonymity in the review process, I don't post the titles of my unpublished work here. But if you're looking for a visiting speaker or referee, this should give you a sense of what I'm working on. In some cases drafts are available upon request.
Papers currently under review A paper on intention and normative judgment. A paper on shared agency and cognitive sophistication. Work in progress A paper on motivating reasons and the Reasoning View. A paper on subjective reasons and the Reasoning View. A paper laying out the master argument for the Reasoning View. A paper on the functionalism and the requirements of rationality. A paper on squeamishness. A paper on forgetfulness. Some day... A book about the Reasoning View. A collection of essays on underappreciated irrationalities. Some kind of explanation of why I am not a consequentialist. |
Fig. 3: Winter in São Paulo, Brasil
keywords: samuel asarnow, sam asarnow, asarnow
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